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Preemption Analysis After
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.
BY SUSAN D. HALL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal preemption of state claims forms a crucial defense in many
product liability cases. Such preemption can foreclose plaintiffs'
remedies or greatly reduce the types and amount of damages that plaintiffs
can seek.' Preemption can also keep a litigant out of state court.' In
addition, conventional wisdom says that federal juries are more frugal with
damages and that federal judges are more favorable to defendants.3 As a
result, product manufacturer defendants have an enormous incentive to seek
preemption, and plaintiffs have an enormous incentive to keep their claims
from being preempted.
Traditionally, preemption analysis has been based on the three
categories set forth by the Supreme Court in the 1912 case of Savage v.
Jones:
4
(1) express preemption, where Congress explicitly defines the extent to
which its enactments preempt state law; (2) field preemption [also known
* J.D. expected 2002, University of Kentucky. The author wishes to thank Mary
J. Davis, Stites & Harbison Professor of Law, University of Kentucky, for
suggesting the topic of this Note and Aaron L. Hall for his continuing encourage-
ment and support.
'See, e.g., Wood v. Gen. Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 402 (1st Cir. 1988)
(holding that a state common-law defective design claim against an automobile
manufacturer for failure to provide airbags was preempted by the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act).
2 See, e.g., Massey Burge v. Jones, No. B-92-022, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21208, at *7-8 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 1992). But see, e.g., Kagan v. Carwell Corp.,
No. CV-01-00852, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4544, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2001).
3SeegenerallyNeal Miller, An Empirical Study ofForum Choices in Removal
Cases Under Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 369
(1992) (discussing how plaintiffs report a perceived bias for defendants in the
federal system resulting in lower verdicts and increased pressure to accept
settlements).
" Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501(1912).
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as implied preemption], where state law attempts to regulate conduct in
a field that Congress intended the federal law exclusively to occupy; and
(3) conflict preemption, where it is impossible to comply with both state
and federal requirements, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and objectives of
Congress.5
Little more than these three categories has stayed constant in the last nine
years, however. The Supreme Court has revisited its preemption analysis
no fewer than four times since 1992.6 Because preemption can play a large
role in the logistics and ultimate disposition ofa case, litigants must remain
abreast of this evolving doctrine. This could be a difficult task until the
early 1990s because of the complicated and sometimes arbitrary preemption
analysis that the Supreme Court mandated. 7
In 1992, however, the Supreme Court decided Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc.' and provided a welcome respite for litigants. The test set forth
in Cipollone was predictable and easy to apply-an amazing feat consider-
ing preemption doctrine's reputation as having "logical, theoretical and
practical difficulties."9 Part of this reputation was a result of the Court's
emphasis on implied preemption, a doctrine that allowed broad judicial
discretion in determining congressional intent." Such broad discretion
made for an unpredictable test and raised serious federalism concerns.
These difficulties made Cipollone a judicial breath of fresh air. In
Cipollone the Court relinquished some of its broad discretion in favor of a
textualist approach to federal legislation and preemption-looking to what
Congress said to determine what Congress intended.'
Unfortunately, the relief litigants enjoyed under Cipollone did not last
long. In May, 2000, when the Supreme Court decided Geier v. American
5 Indus. Truck Ass'n v. Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1997).
6See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000); Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996); Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995);
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
7 See Mary J. Davis, Handling Preemption Questions After Geier v. American
Honda Motor Company, PRODUCT LIABILITY ADVISORY, July 2000, at 1-2.
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 504.
9S. Candace Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71
B.U. L. REv. 687, 700 (1991).
10 Id
.
" See discussion infra Part H.A.
2 See discussion infra Part l.B.
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Honda Motor Co., 3 it once again complicated preemption analysis,
rendering it even more trying than before. As some commentators have
noted, however, the problem did not start with Geier.' In the ten years
prior to Geier, the Supreme Court's preemption decisions placed a steadily
declining emphasis on express preemption analysis, with it finally being
abandoned completely in the Geier decision."5 In recognition of this trend,
some commentators called for a simpler test.
1 6
This Note argues that Geier does not represent such a test. More
specifically, it argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Geier unneces-
sarily muddles preemption analysis by retreating from its prior emphasis on
express preemption and by replacing it with a complicated implied
preemption analysis that is statute specific, thereby necessitating Supreme
Court decisions for each federal statutory scheme in order for litigants to
know the current state of the law.' As a result of these difficulties, this
Note advocates returning to the Cipollone analysis when Congress has
spoken via an express preemption provision. To that end, Part II discusses
the history of preemption analysis, specifically focusing on the trio of
decisions handed down in the 1990s: Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 8
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 9 and Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.2" Part II also
details how the Court has strayed progressively farther from its express
preemption analysis as set forth in Cipollone." Part III discusses the facts,
procedural history, and the Court's analysis in the Geier decision.22 Part IV
discusses problems with Geier, including the federalism issues raised and
how a more logical system of preemption flows from the Cipollone
doctrine.' This Note concludes with suggestions on how litigants facing
preemption questions post-Geier should approach the test under the
analysis currently mandated by the Supreme Court.'
" Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
'
4 See Susan Raeker-Jordan, The Pre-emption Presumption that Never Was:
Pre-Emption Doctrine Swallows the Rule, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 1379, 1380 (1998).
" See discussion infra Part fl.
16 See Raeker-Jordan, supra note 14, at 1380.
17 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
"Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
'
9 Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995).
2 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).21 See infra Part II.BD.
22 See infra Part III.
23 See infra Part IV.
24See infra Part V.
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II. PREEMPTION ANALYSIS BEFORE GEJER
A. History and Description of the Types of Federal Preemption
Federal preemption of state laws is derived from the Supremacy Clause
of the United States Constitution, which provides: "This Constitution and
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof...
shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." The principle that
Congress possesses supreme power over state lawmaking bodies is limited
by the equally fundamental principle that states have inherent police
powers in which the federal government ought not to interfere.26 As a result
of these "inherent" police powers, there exists an often-cited presumption
against preemption, in recognition of the deference that should be given
state legislatures to enact laws for the health and safety of their citizens.27
Tension resulting from these conflicting sources of power has placed courts
in the uncomfortable position of balancing the need for deference to state
lawmaking authority with Congress's ability to pass laws that are, by
definition, superior to those of the states. The Supreme Court's discomfort
with the matter is perhaps best expressed in its difficulty in formulating a
workable preemption doctrine.28
In spite of this difficulty, the Supreme Court's definitions of the three
types of federal preemption have been widely accepted by courts and
commentators for over eighty years." As previously noted, preemption
analysis can fall into one of three categories: field preemption, conflict
preemption, or express preemption3 Field preemption arises when
Congress has regulated in a particular field to such an extent that it is
reasonable to assume that it intended no other legislation to coexist.3 In
other words, Congress has left no room for other legislation to exist. As one
commentator has noted:
If federal law has so occupied the field, even state laws which are
consistent with or supplementary to the federal law are invalid, because
Congress has impliedly taken exclusive control of the subject. In addition,
2 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.26 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230 (1947).
27See id; see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,485 (1996).
8 See Raeker-Jordan, supra note 14, at 1383.
29 The Court returned to the categories set out in Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501
(1912) in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 867 (2000).
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
31 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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when Congress has so occupied the field but failed to legislate concerning
the particular aspect of the field, a state may not, consistent with
preemption doctrine, legislate on that aspect32
In contrast, conflict preemption exists where state laws and congressio-
nal legislation cannot be harmonized. That is, conflict preemption is found
where state law conflicts with federal legislation or "frustrates the purposes
and objectives of Congress in enacting the federal law."'33 On the other
hand, express preemption applies where Congress has specifically
addressed preemption and has provided for the circumstances in which
state laws are preempted by federal legislation.'
When a court finds that a state law has been preempted in any of these
three ways, plaintiffs are precluded from bringing their state law claims.
This is true whether the claims are common-law causes of action or state
statutory claims 5 Thus, ifa claim is found to be preempted, plaintiffs' only
remedy is through federal law, in federal court.
From the 1912 birth of preemption as a tool used by the courts, until the
1992 decision of Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,36 courts have had
difficulty articulating just when Congress had preempted state law. 7 The
difficulty was formulating an implied preemption test that could be applied
to different statutory schemes and determining how the need for deference
to traditional state police power should be balanced against the federal
government's right to create uniform laws. 8 Finally, in Cipollone, the
Court articulated a workable analysis-not by utilizing the implied
preemption doctrine, but by using an express preemption analysis. 9
B. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.: The High Point of Preemption
Analysis
Before 1992, federal preemption of state common-law damages actions
was analyzed under implied preemption doctrines.4" Implied preemption
32Timothy Wilton, Federalism Issues in "No Airbag " Tort Claims: Preemption
and Reciprocal Comity, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 12 (1986).33 1c
34 d For an example of an express preemption provision, see 21 U.S.C. §
360k(a) (1998).35 See Wilton, supra note 32, at 17.36 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).3
' For a discussion of the history of preemption doctrine and the Court's
struggle with it, see Raeker-Jordan, supra note 14, at 1384-99.38 See id. at 1386-87.
39 See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517.
o Davis, supra note 7, at 2.
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doctrines are problematic for several reasons. First, they give judges
discretion that is too broad, resulting in inconsistent application of the
doctrine. As Professor Mary Davis has noted, "implied preemption
doctrines leave ample room for litigants and trial judges to manipulate the
unspoken intent of Congress to preempt state law, and have been widely
criticized on that basis." ' Because of the potential for manipulation and
abuse, it is difficult for litigants to predict how implied preemption will be
applied in any individual case.
Furthermore, under implied preemption, the fundamental goal of fair,
predictable law is frustrated.42 This broad discretion raises federalism
concerns as well. By manipulating congressional intent to suit their own
purposes, judges run afoul of the founding principle that the proper role of
the legislature is to legislate, while the proper role of the judiciary is to
apply the laws created by the legislature.
Perhaps as a result of these problems, use of implied preemption
analysis began to decline with Justice Stevens's opinion in Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc.43 That case involved the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act and Amendments ("FCLAA"). The plaintiff, the
surviving spouse of a long-time smoker," sued cigarette manufac-
turers alleging common-law breach of express warranty, fraud and
misrepresentation, conspiracy, and failure to warn claims.45 The task for the
Court was to determine whether either the 1965 FCLAA or its 1969
amendments preempted the plaintiff's claims.' The Court began its
preemption analysis by saying, "the purpose of Congress is the ultimate
touchstone."'47 To determine Congress's intent, the Court first turned to the
language of section 5, the preemption provision of the 1965 Act, which
states:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement
required by section 4 of this Act, shall be required on any cigarette
package.
41 Id.
42See Raeker-Jordan, supra note 14, at 1452.
41 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 504.
"Rose Cipollone and herhusbandwere the initialplaintiffs. AfterRose's death
in 1984, her husband filed an amended complaint The couple's son maintained the
action after his father's death. Id at 509.
4sId.
4Id. at 508.47 1d at 516 (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhom, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)).
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(b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the
advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in
conformity with the provisions of this Act.'
Regarding the 1965 preemption provision, the Court said, "Congress spoke
precisely and narrowly: 'No statement relating to smoking and health shall
be required in the advertising of [properly labeled] cigarettes.' "9 Noting
that because "there is no general, inherent conflict between federal pre-
emption of state warning requirements and the continued vitality of state
common-law damages actions," ° the Court held that "the term 'regulation'
most naturally refers to positive enactments . . . not to common-law
damages actions."5 ' Thus, the Court held, state common-law damages
actions were not preempted under the 1965 Act 2
The Court then turned to the 1969 amendment to the Act, holding that
its language was broader and barred not simply "statement[s] but rather
'requirement[s] or prohibition[s] ... imposed under State law.' , The
language of the 1969 Act is as follows: "No requirement or prohibition
based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect
to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are
labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter."' The Court
found that state law damages actions based on the existence of a legal duty
often do impose "requirements or prohibitions" and thus, can be
preempted 5
The Court then turned to the specific state law actions brought by the
plaintiff and, using the express language of the statute along with the
presumption against preemption, determined that the plaintiff's breach of
warranty claims, "'though made with respect to... advertising' ... do[ ]
not rest on a duty imposed under state law" and thus, were not preempted. 6
In addition, the Court held that the plaintiff's conspiracy claim, which
rested on a duty not to conspire to commit fraud, was not preempted
because it was not a prohibition "based on smoking and health."57 Finally,
481d at 514 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982 version)).
49 Id at 518.
50 Id.
51 d at 519.
5 2 Id at 519-20.
51Id at 520.
5' 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1998).
51 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 522.5 Id. at 526-27.
7 Id. at 529-30.
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the Court held that the plaintiff's fraudulent misrepresentation claim, in
which he asserted that the defendants were" 'negligent in the manner [that]
they tested, researched, sold, promoted, and advertised' their cigarettes,"
was not preempted because the claim was not related to the defendant's
advertising practices.58
The Court held that section 5 of the Act did, however, preempt the
plaintiff's first fraudulent misrepresentation claim, which was "predicated
on a state law prohibition against statements in advertising and promotional
materials that tend to minimize the health hazards associated with smok-
ing."'59 That claim alleged that the defendants' advertising "neutralized the
effect of federally mandated warning labels." The Court also held that
"insofar as claims under either failure-to-warn theory require a showing
that respondents' post- 1969 advertising or promotions should have included
additional, or more clearly stated warnings, those claims are pre-empted"'
to the "extent that they rely on a state-law 'requirement or prohibition...
with respect to... advertising or promotion"' 62 within the meaning of
section 5b.
This simple, logical conclusion represents the high point of preemption
analysis. With its Cipollone decision, the Court simplified what was a
confusing and difficult test to apply and replaced it with one that does not
disrupt the delicate balance between federalism and Supremacy Clause
concerns. The test as summarized by Justice Stevens in Cipollone is as
follows:
When Congress has considered the issue ofpre-emption and has included
in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and
when that provision provides a "reliable indicium of congressional intent
with respect to state authority, there is no need to infer congressional
intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions" of the
legislation.'
58 Id. at 524-25.
59 Id at 527.
60 Id
6
" Id at 524. Actions instituted for failure to warn include claims that the defen-
dants were negligent in the manner that they tested, researched, sold, promoted, and
advertised their cigarettes, or that they failed to provide adequate warnings of
smoking's consequences. Id.62I d
63 Id. at 517 (citation omitted) (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S.
497, 505 (1978); see also Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272,
282 (1987)). This test became law because Stevens's opinion was joined in its
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The Court also stated, "In this case there is no 'good reason to believe'
that Congress meant less than what it said; indeed, in light of the narrow-
ness of the 1965 Act, there is 'good reason to believe' that Congress meant
precisely what it said in amending that Act." Analyzing what Congress
has actually said when it has spoken on the subject of preemption is the
best possible way to determine congressional intent, which is, after all, the
"touchstone of preemption analysis."65
C. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick: A Step Away From Cipollone
The Supreme Court did not hear another preemption case for three
years after Cipollone. Then, in Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick,6 a case
involving a design defect claim against an anti-lock brake manufacturer, the
Court unanimously held that the plaintiffs' state law design defect claims
were not preempted.' The case arose out of two separate, but nearly
identical, accidents. In the first, the plaintiff, Ben Myrick, was brain
damaged and rendered a paraplegic when a tractor-trailer, unable to stop
quicklyjack knifed into oncoming traffic.8 The second action was brought
on behalf of Grace Lindsay after she died from injuries sustained in a head-
on collision with ajack-knifed truck.69 Neither truck in the two cases was
equipped with an anti-lock braking system ("ABS"). 0 Both plaintiffs
brought design defect claims, which the defendants removed to federal
court.
7 1
Defendants Freightliner and Navistar argued that the claims were
preempted under a safety standard, known as Standard 21, promulgated by
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"), which
imposed stopping distances and vehicle stability requirements for trucks.'
The underlying Act, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
1966,' contained a preemption provision which provided:
entirety by Justices Rhenquist, White, and O'Connor and was joined in Parts I-IV
(sections containing the test) by Justices Blackmun, Souter, and Kennedy.
'Id. at 522.6 1 d at 516 (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)).
' Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995).
67 Ma at 289.
6 Id. at 282.69 Id
70d.
71 Id at 283.
72See 36 Fed. Reg. 3817 (1997).
7 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 1381-1397 (1993) (originally enacted Pub. L. No. 89-563,80
Stat. 718 (1966) (repealed 1994)). The underlying Act delegated authority to
NHTSA to promulgate standards.
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Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this
title is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any
authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any
motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard
applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of
equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard. Nothing in this
section shall be construed as preventing any State from enforcing any
safety standard which is identical to a Federal safety standard.74
In addition, the Act had a saving clause which provided: "Compliance with
any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this title does not
exempt any person from any liability under common law."'75 Congress
generally puts such a clause in legislation when it wants to make clear that
state common-law actions are not preempted.76 Hence, the clause is called
a "saving clause" because common-law actions are "saved" or not
preempted. In spite of the presence ofa saving clause, however, the district
court held that the claims were impliedly preempted.' The court of appeals
reversed and held that under Cipollone implied preemption cannot exist
where a statute has an express preemption clause.78
On review, in an opinion that began the trend of eroding Cipollone, the
Supreme Court addressed the holding of the court of appeals, saying, "The
fact that an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a statute
'implies'-i.e., supports a reasonable inference--that Congress did not
intend to pre-empt other matters does not mean that the express clause
entirely forecloses any possibility of implied pre-emption." 9 The Court
also stretched dicta in Justice Stevens's Cipollone opinion, noting, "Indeed,
just two paragraphs after the quoted passage in Cipollone, we engaged in
a conflict pre-emption analysis of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act... and found 'no general, inherent conflict between
federal pre-emption of state warning requirements and the continued
vitality of state common-law damages actions."' 80 The two paragraphs
referred to in Cipollone, in fact, do not represent a conflict preemption
analysis, but rather, provide support for the Court's conclusion that express
74Id. § 1392(d).
75 Id § 1397(k).76 See Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 493 (1987).
7 Myrick v. Freuhauf Corp., 795 F. Supp. 1139 (N.D. Ga. 1992).
78 Myrick v. Freuhauf Corp., 13 F.3d 1516 (11th Cir. 1994).79 Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280,288 (1995).
8 Id at 288-89 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518
(1992)).
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preemption analysis is the appropriate means of determining congressional
intent where Congress has spoken. The paragraph to which the Freightliner
Court refers reads, in part:
Beyond the precise words of these provisions, this reading [of the
actual words of the statute] is appropriate for several reasons. First...
we must construe these provisions in light of the presumption against...
pre-emption .... Second, the warning re.quired.. does not by its own
effect foreclose additional obligations imposed under state law. That
Congress requires a particular warning label does not automatically pre-
empt a regulatory field .... Third, there is no general, inherent conflict
between federal pre-emption of state warning requirements and the
continued vitality of state common-law damages actions."
This paragraph is merely an affirmation of the Cipollone Court's express
preemption analysis. By noting that Congress's purposefully chosen,
narrowly tailored words were not inconsistent with already settled
principles of statutory construction and preemption doctrine, the Cipollone
Court countered the dissent's argument that the express provision ran afoul
of the preemption principle that state common-law actions can never
coexist alongside federal warning requirements.'
The Freightliner Court went on to hold that the "implied versus express
preemption" issue was of no consequence. The plaintiffs' common-law
actions were not in conflict with federal law as a result of the ruling of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that the safety standard was "not reasonable
nor practicable" and the standard's subsequent suspension by the
NHTSA.' Thus, no federal regulation existed that could conflict with the
state law claims.
This represents an erosion of Cipollone's core principle-an implied
preemption analysis is unnecessary where Congress has spoken on the
matter." Oddly, although the Freightliner Court acknowledged that
Cipollone could support an inference that an express preemption clause
forecloses implied preemption, the Court did not interpret Cipollone as
establishing such a rule.' By dismissing Cipollone's core principle as an
81 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518.
92 Id at 534 (Blackmun, L., dissenting).
83 Freightliner, 514 U.S. at 285 (quoting Paccar, Inc. v. NHTSA, 573 F.2d 632,
640 (1978)).
" See discussion supra Part H.B.
Is Freightliner, 514 U.S. at 289.
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inference, the Freightliner Court set the stage for implied preemption to
swallow express preemption analysis once again. Furthermore, the Court
also left the saving clause question unanswered. The reader is left to
wonder whether the saving clause would have played a role in foreclosing
implied preemption analysis had the safety standard not been suspended.
D. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr: Increasing the Court's Distance From
Cipollone
The third decision in the preemption trilogy of the 1990s, Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr,' took yet one more step away from the Cipollone test Express
preemption was again the Court's first focus. The case involved a design
defect and failure to warn claim under the Medical Device Act ("MDA")
amendments. 7 The plaintiffwas injured when her pacemaker failed.' The
pacemaker had been approved under a special FDA provision allowing for
pro forma approval as long as the device was similar to others already
approved. 9 Medtronic, the pacemaker manufacturer, argued that since the
FDA had approved the device, the plaintiff's claim was automatically
preempted by the MDA amendments' preemption provision," which states:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or
political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with
respect to a device intended for human use any requirement-
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement
applicable under this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any
other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under
this chapter."
The district court dismissed the defendant's summary judgment motion on
the basis that no evidence indicated that the claims were preempted.' The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that at least some of the claims
were preempted and remanded to the district court, which then dismissed
86 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
87 1 d
98Id. at 481.
89 Id. at 480.
90 Id at 481.
91 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994).
9Medronic, 518 U.S. at 482.
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all of the plaintiff's claims as preempted under the MDA.93 The court of
appeals then reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding that state
common-law actions are state requirements under § 360k(a). 4
The Supreme Court, in another opinion written by Justice Stevens for
a plurality of the Court, acknowledged again that Congress's intent is the
"ultimate touchstone" and is primarily discerned from the language of the
preemption statute and the statutory framework surrounding it.95 Justice
Stevens went on to emphasize the relevancy of the structure and purpose
of the statute as a whole, "as revealed not only in the text, but through the
reviewing court's reasoned understanding of the way in which Congress
intended the statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to affect
business, consumers, and the law." This is an even more disturbing
departure from Cipollone than that of Freightliner. With this, the Court had
all but abandoned the express preemption analysis set forth in Cipollone
and had opened the door to replacing it with full-scale implied preemption
analysis in which judges once again attempt to discern congressional intent
that cannot be found on the face of the congressional legislation in
question. Courts again would be able to manipulate their implied preemp-
tion analysis to reach any desired conclusion, perhaps influenced by a
particular court's pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant leanings. The federalism
issues raised are obvious.
The Court attempted to ameliorate its departure by distinguishing
Cipollone on the basis that a finding of preemption in Medtronic would
deprive plaintiffs of redress for many medical devices in existence.9' In
contrast, the Court said that "[t]he pre-emptive statute in Cipollone was
targeted at a limited set of state requirements-those 'based on smoking
and health."'" Thus, the Court held that "requirement," as used in the
MDA, had a different meaning than "requirement," as used in the Cigarette
Act, and found that the claims were not preempted."
Though the Court again emphasized express preemption analysis, this,
like the Freightliner decision, undeniably represents a chipping away at the
vitality of the Cipollone preemption test. Worse yet, the Court's hybrid
Cipollone analysis raises several questions. For example, how does the
93 Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335 (1 1th Cir. 1995).
94 Id
95 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485.
" Id at 486 (emphasis added).
97Id at 487.
9Id at 488.
99 Id at 470.
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reviewing court reach its "reasoned analysis?" Does it wade through stacks
of legislative hearing transcripts to put itself in Congress's position at the
time the law was passed? More importantly, why should the Court assume
that Congress was unable to articulate what it really meant in the statute?
With these questions still unanswered, the Court made its final leap away
from Cipollone's logical, simple test to the slippery banks of implied
preemption analysis.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN GEER
A. The Geier Facts and Procedural History
In 1992, Alexis Geier's 1987 Honda Accord struck a tree, injuring
her."° She was wearing a seatbelt, but her car was not equipped with an
airbag."° She and her parents sued Honda, the manufacturer, for defective
design because of the lack of airbags."° The district court dismissed the
lawsuit, holding that the 1984 version of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard ("FMVSS") 208 preempted the claims by giving manufacturers
a choice in installing airbags."° The express preemption portion of the
FMVSS is as follows:
Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this
title is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any
authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any
motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard
applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of
equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard.'04
The FMVSS also contained a saving clause, which stated, "Compliance
with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this title does
not exempt any person from any liability under common law."'"5 The
district court held that because the plaintiffs' claim purported to establish
a different safety standard than that set forth in FMVSS 208, the claim was
'0o Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 865 (2000).
101 Id.
102 Id.
03 Id.
104 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1993) (repealed 1997).
105 Id § 1397(k).
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expressly preempted."° The court of appeals affirmed, saying that the state
law damages action conflicted with FMVSS 208 and thus, under implied
conflict preemption analysis, the claims were preempted. 7 The court of
appeals, unlike the district court, was concerned about the saving clause;
however, it declined to reach the issue of whether common-law damages
actions could be considered safety regulations where a saving clause
exists.' °
B. The Supreme Court's Express Preemption and Saving Clause Analysis
The Supreme Court began by correctly applying the Cipollone analysis
to the facts ofthe case: "We first ask whether the Safety Act's express pre-
emption provision pre-empts this tort action."'" Honda argued that the
Court should use its construction of the word "requiremenf' in Medironic
to find that the similar "safety standard" as used in the wording of the
statute included common-law damages actions."' The plaintiffs argued that
a safety standard is different than a "requiremenf' and, under Cipollone,
does not preempt state common-law damages actions."'
The Court rejected both claims, holding that in light of the saving
clause, construction of the words "safety standard" was not necessary."
2
The Court noted that without the saving clause, a broad reading of the
express preemption provision was possible and the common-law claims
could be preempted.' Thus, the Court used the saving clause to avoid the
operation of such a broad reading and held that "[t]he language of the pre-
emption provision permits a narrow reading that excludes common-law
actions. Given the presence of the saving clause, we conclude that the pre-
emption clause must be so read."'" Up to this point, the Court's analysis
did not conflict with the analysis set out in Cipollone because the Cipollone
statute did not have a saving clause. Furthermore, this was a good start
towards a reasoned interpretation of the saving clause. The Court should
" See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Civ. No. 95-CV-0064 (D.D.C., Dec. 9,
1997).
107 Geier, 529 U.S. at 865-66.
'
0 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 166 F.3d 1236, 1238-43 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
'9 Geier, 529 U.S. at 867.
"0 Id
2 Id. at 867-68.
"I Id. at 868.
114 Id
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have gone even further, however, and held that the phrase "safety standard"
does not refer to or apply to common-law actions."5 It is illogical to read
the words "safety standard" as used in the express preemption provision to
mean state common-law actions when Congress enacted a later saving
clause provision that specifically saves state common-law actions. The
words "safety standard" have a meaning entirely apart from "state common-
law actions." This distinction should have been acknowledged.
Still, at this point in the Court's opinion the result is correct. The word
"standard" has a clear, common definition and refers to safety standards
promulgated by state agencies. There is no reason to give it any other
meaning. The later-enacted saving clause in no way conflicts with this. It
is also clear on its face: state common-law actions are still valid. What is
troubling, however, is that the plain meaning of the express preemption
provision should have been analyzed in order to reach this conclusion.
Instead, the Court notes that this holding does not conflict with its decision
in Freightliner, which left the saving clause question open.' 6
Unfortunately, the Court did not stop there. It then revived its implied
preemption analysis, saying that the result of the express preemption
provision and the saving clause was to create a neutral policy towards
preemption-in effect, they cancelled each other out."7 The Court
concluded that "the saving clause.., does not bar the ordinary working of
conflict pre-emption principles.""' This was an unnecessary detour. The
Court had already reached the correct result. There was no reason to drag
implied preemption into the opinion to complicate the analysis for the
Geier litigants and all subsequent litigants with preemption claims. As the
dissent notes, "The Court contends... that a saving clause cannot foreclose
implied conflict pre-emption. The cases it cites to support that point,
however, merely interpreted the language of the particular saving clauses
at issue and concluded that those clauses did not foreclose implied pre-
emption."' 9
The Court also rejected the dissent's assertion that the express
preemption provision combined with the saving clause creates a special
" But see Wilton, supra note 32, at22 (noting that courts have consistently and
compellingly argued that saving clauses should not be read literally to allow all
state common-law tort actions because this could effectively lead to the nullifica-
tion of federal laws).
16 Geier, 529 U.S. at 872-73.
117 Id. at 869.
118 Id.
"9 Id. at 900 n.16 (citation omitted) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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burden on the party claiming implied, conflict preemption.2 o Ironically, the
Court rejected this claim on the basis of the increased system-wide costs
that would accrue "as courts tried sensibly to distinguish among varieties
of 'conflict' ... when applying this complicated rule to the many federal
statutes that contain some form of an express pre-emption provision, a
saving provision, or as here, both."' As the Court said, "Nothing in the
statute suggests Congress wanted to complicate ordinary experience-proved
principles of conflict pre-emption .... We would not further complicate
the law with complex new doctrine."'2 Yet that is exactly what the Court
has done in bringing back its old implied preemption analysis. The
Cipollone test was simple and easily applied: when Congress has spoken,
its words control." Though the Court's return to implied preemption
analysis in Geier does not represent new doctrine, it certainly and
needlessly does complicate the law.
C. The Court's Implied Preemption Analysis
The Court began its implied preemption analysis by examining the
possible existence of conflict preemption, stating the basic question as
"whether a common-law 'no airbag' action like the one before [them]
actually conflicts with FMVSS 208.'' " First, the Court looked to the
Department of Transportation's ("DOT") explanation of FMVSS 208,
noting that it reflected "significant considerations."" Among these
considerations were the effectiveness of seatbelts when used and the
disadvantages of passive restraint systems, including increased automobile
cost, increased replacement cost, and potential public resistance to
airbags.'26 The Court pointed out that "DOT now tells us... the 1984
version of FMVSS 208 'embodies the Secretary's policy judgment that
safety would best be promoted if manufacturers installed alternative
protection systems in their fleets rather than one particular system in every
car.' 12 7 Thus, the Court determined that a state law imposing a tort duty
120 Id. at 872-73.
121 Id at 874.
12 Id.
" See discussion supra Part H.B.
124 Geier, 529 U.S. at 874.
125 Id at 877.
126 Id. at 877-78.
12 1 Id at 881 (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Association of Trial
Lawyers of America at 25, Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000)
(No. 98-9811)).
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to install an airbag would have presented an obstacle to the statute's
purpose of obtaining a variety of passive restraint systems in
automobiles.2
It is easy to see the Court's problem. Intuitively, a state law action
requiring airbags seems incongruous with a federal statute specifically
allowing manufacturers to choose if they want to include airbags in their
automobiles. Perhaps it was in part this dilemma that drove the Court to
abandon its more reasoned Cipollone analysis. Critics might argue that
courts should not be expected to yield to congressional intent when
Congress has enacted a law such as this, which says that manufacturers
have a choice in installing airbags and yet allows manufacturers to be held
liable under state law for not installing airbags. As the dissent notes,
however, this argument is premised on a
fundamental misconception of the nature of the duties imposed by tort
law. A general verdict of liability in a case seeking damages for negligent
and defective design... does not amount to an immutable, mandatory
rule of state tort law imposing... a duty... [T]he Court is quite wrong
to suggest that, as a consequence of such a verdict, only the installation
of airbags would enable manufacturers to avoid liability in the future.129
As Professor Davis argues:
It is not difficult at all to understand why Congress would write a savings
clause in a way that focuses on only those who comply with the federal
regulation: because those who do not comply have no claim to federal
protection in the first place. Congress can choose to provide that those
who have obeyed a federal requirement are, nonetheless, unprotected
from traditional principles of common law compensation mechan-
isms.130
In addition, allowing courts to go outside of Congress's express provisions
to search for the true meaning of Congress's words would disrupt the
delicate balance of power between legislatures and courts, as arguably it
12 Id. at 878.
129 Id at 902-03 n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130 Davis, supra note 7, at 4; see also Miranda v. Fridman, 647 A.2d 167, 174
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) ("Admittedly, adopting such areading renders the
savings clause partially redundant. However, that is a lesser offense than adopting
a reading that renders the clause contrary to a principal purpose of Congress.").
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did in the years between the Court's first preemption decision and its
decision in Cipollone.1'
Perhaps the Court is unwilling to adhere to its Cipollone analysis
because express preemption analysis is much more difficult for the Court
to control and does occasionally lead to results that seem illogical at first
glance. Implied preemption analysis, on the other hand, gives the Court
much more control over the outcome. The value of this to the Court can be
seen in Geier. The Court's correct express preemption analysis led to an
undesirable result, apparently inducing the Court to "fix" the result via an
implied preemption analysis in which it could attribute intent on the part of
Congress consistent with what the Court viewed as the correct outcome.
IV. WHERE DOES GEIER TAKE US AND CAN WE EVER GET BACK?
A. Problems With the Geier Decision
The Geier decision is the final word on how saving clauses and express
and implied preemption provisions interact.'32 The Court's holding that
implied preemption analysis is not foreclosed even where a saving clause
is present and its finding that the plaintiffs' claims were impliedly
preempted are problematic for several reasons. The decision presents a
logical difficulty in understanding why the saving clause would save the
common-law action from the express preemption provision but not from
implied preemption analysis. In addition, the implied preemption analysis
raises serious federalism concerns. A founding principle of this nation is
that the legislative branch of the government, with greater resources to
conduct hearings and to sift through research, creates laws. Yet, after
Geier, federal courts will be free to manipulate implied preemption
analysis, resulting in judge-made law that is, at best, "not precisely
defined"' and ill-considered. As a result of the unlimited discretion that
judges now have in analyzing preemption issues, litigants are afforded no
certainty in how preemption analysis will be applied to their cases.
134
Furthermore, this problem is compounded by the fact that the Court's
analysis is so specific to the FMVSS's provisions that neither courts nor
future litigants will have any tools for applying the analysis to different
.31 See discussion supra Part I.A-B.
' See Davis, supra note 7, at 4.
"' Geier, 529 U.S. at 887 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114 See BriefofAmicus Curiae of the Association of Trial Lawyers ofAmerica,
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (No. 98-9811).
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regulations. This raises the question: Is the Court planning to hand down
a decision for every federal statutory regulation scheme? The Cipollone
analysis, in contrast, is easily applied to any federal regulation. Further-
more, it respects the right of Congress to enact legislation that will be
interpreted on its face and fairly applied in courts.
B. How the Court Should Have Decided Geier
The Court should have stayed true to its simpler, well-reasoned analysis
in Cipollone. Under the Cipollone analysis, the Court would have first
determined if the express preemption provision applied to the plaintiffs'
state law claims.' In order to do this properly, the Court should have
determined if the word "standard" had the same meaning as the word
"requirement" and if it included common-law actions, as it had in previous
cases. 36 While the Court in Geier did give a cursory examination of the
express preemption clause, holding that it did not preempt the claim in light
of the saving clause-a logical and well-reasoned result-it skipped an
important step: it should have analyzed the word "standard."' More
importantly, the Court should have adhered to its rule in Cipollone: implied
preemption analysis is improper where a saving clause exists. Had the
Court applied the analysis correctly, it would have found that the plaintiffs'
common-law cause of action was not preempted.
V. CONCLUSION:
How DO CURRENT LITIGANTS HANDLE THE POSSIBILITY
OF PREEMPTION AFTER GEIER?
After Geier, litigants bringing or facing preemption claims must be
prepared to meet the demands of an implied preemption analysis. Unfortu-
nately, no one can be sure what such an analysis will hold until the ink is
dry on the particular court's opinion. There are still some certainties to help
litigants, however.
First, under Geier (as well as Freightiner"' and Medtronic"') the
Court's nearly ninety-year-old categories survive. Thus, now, as before,
"' See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992); see also discus-
sion supra Part II.B.6 See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,486-88 (1996).
"17 Geier, 529 U.S. at 867-69.
" See discussion supra Part II.C.
' See discussion supra Part ll.D.
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litigants can expect to have their claims analyzed under field (implied),
conflict, and express preemption doctrines."1° Unfortunately, little more has
stayed constant in preemption analysis over the last ten years and litigants
can expect even more changes, particularly if the Court continues its recent
trend of handing down a new decision every few years on a different
federal statutory scheme.141
Second, if there is an express preemption provision, litigants can expect
that it will be used as a starting point for the Court's preemption analysis,
but that implied and conflict analysis will supplement the express analysis.
Because the implied analysis is so easily manipulated, litigants can expect
the express preemption analysis to be swallowed by the more flexible
implied analysis. After all, if a court does not like the outcome under the
express analysis, it is free, after Geier, to grope for Congress's true intent
through legislative history until it reaches a more satisfactory result. While
Geier could have changed the trend towards implied preemption analysis
and reinstated Cipollone nicely with its saving clause and express
preemption provision, it did not. Consequently, implied preemption now
stands as the rule.
Finally, litigants can expect that saving clauses will be of little force
post-Geier. If a litigant faces a statute with a saving clause as well as an
express preemption provision, the court has precedent available that allows
it essentially to disregard both if the court deems that doing so would lead
to Congress's intended result. As Professor Davis notes,
What is the focus of... implied preemption analysis?... Whatever the
trial judge wants it to be. Artful litigants will be wise to look closely at the
history of the regulation in question and to support preemption by
articulating a narrow federal objective with which the common law
damages action at issue is sure to conflict. 42
Conversely, litigants who hope that a court will find that federal law does
preempt the state law claims at issue should argue Congress's statutory
objectives broadly and recognize that they have a powerful ally in the
Court's latest articulation of preemption doctrine.
140 See discussion supra Part II.A.
141 See Geier, 529 U.S. at 861; Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 470; Freightliner Corp.
v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504
(1992).
14 2 See Davis, supra note 7, at 6.
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